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Forging Responsible Unions: 
Metal Workers and the Rise of the Labour 
Injunction in Canada 
Eric Tucker and Judy Fudge 
Introduction 
THE SUBJECT OF THIS ARTICLE is a series of strikes conducted chiefly by 
metalworkers in south central Ontario between 1900 and 1914. These strikes are 
significant because of the novel response to them by employers; they sought and 
obtained legal injunctions on the grounds that the goals pursued or the means used 
by the strikers tortiously interfered with their right to conduct business. Damage 
actions against unions and their officers were also pursued. Courts were sympa-
thetic to these employer claims and the resulting legal interventions placed signifi-
cant limitations on the scope of lawful trade union activity. These restrictions 
remain a central part of modern labour law. ' 
Our purpose, however, is not merely to retrieve the largely forgotten genealogy 
of current law. Rather, this study is part of a larger project examining the role of 
law in constituting, maintaining, shaping, and contesting unequal power relations 
between workers and employers in Canada prior to the advent of statutory collec-
tive bargaining schemes during and after World War n.2 
'For example, the massive use of injunctions by Ontario employers in the 1960s sparked 
two inquiries. See A. W.R. Carrothers, Report of a Study on the Labour Injunctions in Ontario 
(Toronto 1966) and Ontario, Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes, Report 
(Toronto 1968) (Ivan Rand, Commissioner). In response, procedural reforms were enacted 
in 1970. See 77i« Judicature AmendmentAct, 1970(No.2),S.0.1970, c. 91. The substantive 
common law restrictions on strike activity remain. 
For a preliminary sketch of the terrain, see Eric Tucker, "Labour Law and Fragmentation 
before Statutory Collective Bargaining," in Mercedes Steedman, Peter Suschnigg, and 
Dieter K. Buse, eds.. Hard Lessons (Toronto 1995), 99-116. 
Eric Tucker and Judy Fudge, "Forging Responsible Unions: Metal Workers and the Rise of 
the Labour Injunction in Canada," Labour/he Travail, 37 (Spring 1996), 81-120. 
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A study of labour history through the prism of the law yields important insights 
on two of the debates raging within the discipline. The first is on the role of 
institutions and, in particular, the question of their autonomy and the extent to 
which the well-being of the labour movement is tied to a supportive state. The 
second is on the role of discourse and, in particular, legal discourse in setting up 
categories which delimit the realm of legitimate claims, organize those claims in 
particular ways, and privilege some claims over others. 
The debate over the role of institutions and the state has deep roots within the 
labour movement and among labour historians. Within the labour movement, 
proponents of voluntarism and syndicalism have struggled with labourists and 
social democrats over the merits of collective bargaining and direct action, as 
opposed to electoral politics and direct state regulation. The former tend to see the 
capitalist state as inherently hostile and believe that labour should strive for a 
"hands off' policy, while the later hold that workers can make substantial progress 
through parliamentary reforms.3 This debate also has deep resonance between 
labour historians and is overlaid by disagreements over the independent effects of 
institutions on class relations. 
The writing of labour history is sensitive to the shifting fortunes of the labour 
movement. The "old" labour historians tended to focus on the development of the 
institutions of collective bargaining and were often closely associated with indus-
trial pluraliste who viewed the achievement of statutory collective bargaining as a 
progressive outcome of past struggles. Many of these studies were whiggish, 
portraying law's development as a linear progression from repression to toleration 
and, eventually, to the promotion of unions and collective bargaining.4 
The "new" labour historians, rather than celebrating existing labour relations 
schemes, often viewed them as mechanisms that had coopted unions, making them 
managers of discontent rather than agents of progressive change challenging an 
order in which workers interests were subordinated to those of capital. Buoyed by 
renewed radicalism and rank and file militancy in the 1960s, these researchers 
discussion of these debates in Canada at the turn of the century, see A. Ross 
McCormack, Reformers, Rebels, and Revolutionaries (Toronto 1977); Mark Leier, Where 
the Fraser River Flows (Vancouver 1990); and Craig Heron, "Labourism and the Canadian 
Working Class," Labour/U Travail, 13 (1984), 45-16. More generally, see Michael Mann, 
"Sources of Variation in Working-Class Movements in Twentieth-Century Europe," New 
Left Review, 212 (1995), 14-54. 
Tor a more complete discussion of this whiggishness, see Judy Fudge, "Voluntarism, 
Compulsion, and the 'Transformation' of Canadian Labour Law During World War II," in 
Gregory S. Kealey and Greg Patmore, eds., Canadian and Australian Labour History 
(Sydney 1900), 81-100. Two scholars who have embraced this position are Antoine Jacobs, 
"Collective Self-Regulation," in Bob Hepple, éd., The Making of Labour Law in Europe: A 
Comparative Study of Nine Countries Up to 1945 (London 1986) and Gaston V. Rimlinger, 
"Labor and the Government: A Comparative Historical Perspective," Journal of Economic 
History, 37 (1977). 210-29. 
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sought to rediscover an oppositional working-class culture and tradition of resis-
tance on the shop floor and in the streets. In short, they sought to recover the 
"suppressed alternatives" that failed to become institutionalized.3 
Since then, there have been calls for a renewed emphasis on and reassessment 
of industrial relations institutions, including labour law, from a variety of quarters 
including neo-institutionalists,6 regulation theorists,7 industrial relations theorists,8 
and labour9 and labour law10 historians. As in the past, much of this theorizing is 
stimulated by current events: the declining fortunes of the labour movement and 
socialist and social democratic political parties. William Forbath and Victoria 
Hattam, for example, seek to explain the origins of American labour's anti-statism 
and its impact on the weak institutionalization of class relations in the United States 
on the basis of a particularly powerful judiciary's hostility to trade unions in the 
late-19th and early-20th century.11 Chris Tomlins, looking at a later period, 
5 Alan Fox, History and Heritage (London 1985), x l 
*For two excellent collections, see Peter B. Evans et aL, eds., Bringing the State Back In 
(Cambridge 1985) and Sven Steinmo etaL, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutions 
in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge 1992). 
For example, see Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: the Crises of Global Fordism 
(London 1987), ch. 1 and Jane Jenson, "'Different' but not 'Exceptional': Canada's 
Permeable Fordism," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 26 (1989), 69-94. 
Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman, "Industrial Relations in the New Europe: Seventeen 
Types of Ambiguity" in Femer and Hyman, eds., Industrial Relations in the New Europe 
(Oxford 1992), xvi-xlix and Wolfgang Streeck, The Uncertainties of Management in the 
Management of Uncertainty: Employers, Labor Relations, and Industrial Adjustment in the 
1980s," Work, Employment A Society, 1 (1987), 281-308. 
Calls for a renewed focus on institutions have come from a variety of quarters and provoked 
numerous symposia. A partial list includes: Christopher L. Tomlins, The State and the 
Unions (Cambridge 1985); David Brody, "Labor History, Industrial Relations, and the Crisis 
of American Labor," Ind and Labor Relations Review, 43 (1989), 7-18; Jonathan ZeiUin. 
'"Rank and Filism' in British Labour History: A Critique," International Review of Social 
History, 34 (1989), 42-6 (and responses and rejoinder); Howard Kimeldorf, "Bringing 
Unions Back in (Or Why We Need a New Old Labor History)," Labor History, 32 (1991), 
91-103 (and responses); Ira Katznelson, "The 'Bourgeois' Dimension: A Provocation About 
Institutions, Politics, and the Future of American Labor History," International Labor and 
Working-Class History, 46 (1994), 7-32 (and responses); and Melvyn Dubofsky, The State 
and Labor in Modem America (Chapel Hill 1994), esp. xi-xviii. 
10WilliamE. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement (Cambridge 
1989) and "Courts, Constitutions, and Labor Politics in England and America: A Study of 
the Constitutive Power of Law," Law and Social Inquiry, 16 (1991), 1-34; Victoria C. 
Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United 
States (Princeton 1993); and Catherine Fisk, "Still 'Learning Something of Legislation': The 
Judiciary in the History of Labor Law," Law and Social Inquiry, 19 (1994), 151-86 (and 
responses). 
"ibid 
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concludes that labour could only expect to win a "counterfeit liberty" from the 
state.12 Melvyn Dubofsky's recent book shares Forbath's, Hattam's, and Tomlins* 
views on the importance of law and the state in the history of American labour, but 
assesses its role differently. He finds that American workers benefitted from 
positive state intervention at particular junctures and concludes that American 
workers cannot abandon efforts to obtain more favourable legal and administrative 
arrangements.13 Coming from a comparative industrial relations perspective, An-
thony Femer and Richard Hyman argue that die pattern of institutionalization of 
industrial relations helps explain why some labour movements are faring better 
than others in the face of structural changes and conjuncture! crises.14 
While we reject the stronger claims made by neo-institutionalists about the 
autonomy of the state and law, we believe that labour history can benefit from 
careful studies of relations between labour, law, and the state. Class power is not 
independent of institutions, but neither are institutions independent of class power. 
Workers and employers struggle to shape the institutional and legal environment 
in which their relations will be conducted. Once established, this environment has, 
to varying degrees, a life of its own that mediates the effect of future shifts in the 
balance of economic and political power between labour and capital. For example, 
the interventions by the courts that are the subject of this article have had a limiting 
effect on trade union activity and effectiveness over the 20th century, despite 
significant shifts in organized labour's fortunes. Of course, it was not fortuitous 
that courts adopted a position hostile to collective action by workers. Contrary to 
the pluraliste, we reject the view mat institutions like courts (or legislatures) are 
neutral or that workers and employers can usually be expected to exert counter-
vailing power on or within them. 
Ultimately, these debates cannot be resolved theoretically. In our longer study, 
we hope to provide a fuller analysis of the dynamics of the institutionalization of 
class relations in law and its effects. Here, our objective is a more limited one. We 
seek to describe generally the elements of the legal regime that was constructed 
during a critical period of labour's history and to study, in detail, the emergence of 
one particular instrument, the labour injunction. Although Canadian courts had 
been involved in labour disputes earlier because of their criminal law power,1 the 
development of its civil law jurisdiction greatly facilitated the ability of employers 
to invoke judicial power to limit trade union activity. In addition to its repressive 
aims, the litigation also aimed at reshaping trade unions as institutions by making 
them entities legally separate from their members and responsible for their mem-
12Tomlins, 77K State and the Unions, 328. 
13Dubofsky, The State and Labor, xvi-xvii. 
Terner and Hyman, "Industrial Relations," xxxiii. 
1 See Eric Tucker, "'That Indefinite Area of Toleration': Criminal Conspiracy and Trade 
Unions in Ontario, 1833-1877," Labour/Le Travail, 27 (1991), 14-51 and "The Faces of 
Coercion: The Legal Regulation of Labor Conflict in Ontario, 1880-1889," Law & History 
Review, 12 (1994), 277-339. 
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bers' actions. While the litigation was only partially successful in this regard, the 
goal of producing "responsible unionism" was pursued through a number of 
avenues. 
A final point that cannot be fully developed here is the degree of complexity 
and flexibility within institutional arrangements. The concept of institutionaliza-
tion should not connote simple but rigid structures that yield or only permit uniform 
responses regardless of the circumstances. Although such arrangements may 
emerge, they are neither necessary nor normal. The Canadian industrial relations 
regime during this period was institutionally complex, involving overlapping and 
uncertain federal and provincial jurisdiction and activity by the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial branches of government, and was capable of very different 
responses depending on the context While an overview of this institutional 
complexity is provided in the following section, we can only begin to suggest the 
salient factors influencing state and legal responses to a strike. These included, the 
size of the strike, its significance for die national economy or government revenues, 
whether or not skilled or unskilled workers were involved, and die political 
orientation and organizational affiliation of any trade unions involved.17 
The second debate we engage with is over the role of discourse. Law in 
particular is often seen as an important site for the production of discourses that, 
in some readings, are presumed to play an enormously powerful role in shaping 
human consciousness and behaviour. This "linguistic turn" challenges the materi-
alist and class-based analyses mat were common theoretical premises of much of 
the "old" new labour history. Not surprisingly, the ensuing debate has been sharp.18 
Again, while rejecting the stronger claims of discourse theory, the ideological 
role of law merits careful examination. We find it useful to adopt Purvis and Hunt's 
distinction between discourse and ideology. While both refer to the idea that 
people's participation in, and understanding of, social life is mediated by commu-
nicative practices, discourse refers more to the internal features of those practices 
and the processes through which they are produced, while ideology is primarily 
concerned with their external effects. Are discursive practices incorporated into 
lived experience so as to help perpetuate relations of domination and subordination 
16This theme has been developed in an American context by Ruth O'Brien, '"Business 
Unionism' versus 'Responsible' Unionism: Common Law Confusion, the American State, 
and the Formation of Pre-New Deal Labor Policy," Law and Social Inquiry, 18 (1993). 
255-96. 
17The analysis is more fully developed in Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, "The Contexts of 
Coercion: Labour, Law, and the Canadian State, 1900-1914," paper presented at the 
Sixteenth Annual North American Labor History Conference, Wayne State University, 
Detroit, Michigan, 27-29 October 1994. 
,8The literature is voluminous. For a sympathetic assessment, see Lenard R. Berlanstein, 
éd., Rethinking Labor History (Urbana 1993); for a critique, see Bryan D. Palmer, Descent 
into Discourse (Philadelphia 1990). 
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by naturalizing and nonnalizing them? From this perspective, law is a particular 
form of discourse produced through highly stylized, internally rational, and nor-
mative arguments that follow rules distinct from those governing ordinary conver-
sation.20 It is clear that legal discourse may have some material effects insofar as 
law's words are implemented and enforced by organs of the state, ' but the question 
here is to what extent, under what circumstances, and on whom does legal discourse 
have ideological effects? 
The last point requires some explanation. Legal discourse is directed at a 
number of audiences and it is important to consider whether or not it has different 
effects on different groups. In our context, for example, we need to consider the 
ideological effect of law on particular groups of workers (for example, skilled/un-
skilled), on trade union leaders, on employers, on state officials, and on other 
members of the public. Moreover, trying to assess ideological effects raises a host 
of difficult evidentiary and interpretive issues. How do we distinguish between 
what Terry Eagleton has characterized as "normative" and "pragmatic" acceptance 
by subaltern groups of a system of rules that characteristically operates to their 
disadvantage?23 Thus, while this article considers the ideological effect of the 
particular body of case law produced by the courts in the cases under consideration, 
our conclusions remain tentative. 
In what follows, then, we first examine the legal infrastructure of industrial 
relations during this period before turning to our case study. After all, in an 
institutionally complex and flexible regime, knowing what did not happen is as 
important as knowing what did. The case study itself allows us to focus on the 
development of one aspect of a rapidly evolving regime and closely to consider its 
operation and impact in a particular, but not unusual, context. 
Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt, "Discourse, ideology, discourse, ideology, discourse, 
ideology ...," British Journal of Sociology, 44 (1993), 473-99. 
Anthony Woodiwiss, Social Theory after Post-Modemism: Rethinking Production, Law, 
and Class (London 1990). 
This point cannot be too strongly emphasized. See Douglas Hay, "Time, Inequality, and 
Law's Violence," in Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, eds., Law's Violence (Ann Arbor 
1992), 141-73. 
22 
Hay, ibid., 169, highlights the need to consider the differential impact of law's coercion 
and law's word on different audiences: 
"The coercive impact of law is the most important element for those who, in fact, are the 
most direct victims of its violence, the poor, the legitimation of the word is most compelling 
to those predisposed to believe it, who share in it and articulate it. But that legitimation is 
crucial, because it enables the coercion to take place." 
^erry Eagleton, Ideology (London 1991), 56. Also see Alan Hyde, "The Concept of 
Legitimation in the Sociology of Law," Wisconsin Law Review, [1983], 379-426. 
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Legal Infrastructure 
OUR STARTING POINT in discussing the role of law and its instrumentalities is 
that, in capitalism, "private'* power is constituted and supported by a public 
infrastructure and that law is an important component of that infrastructure. Private 
property and market exchange are core institutions of capitalist regimes, and law 
is fundamental to their creation, operation, and legitimation.24 Directly coercive 
law played a prominent role in creating "free" labour and in structuring the labour 
market to the advantage of employers. The "old" coercion, including master and 
servant law and criminal conspiracy, compelled workers, under threat of punish-
ment, to perform their contracts and abstain from collective action. Although used 
more extensively in Great Britain than in Canada through the first three quarters 
of the 19th century, these laws disciplined Canadian workers, especially during 
periods of increased labour conflict Few employers, however, actively resisted 
the repeal of the old coercion in the 1870s. They sensed, perhaps, that die basic 
operating principles and norms of the capitalist labour market were strongly 
institutionalized and that their interests would be protected by the oblique coercion 
of the market regime, legally constituted by the laws of property and contract 
Our characterization of the labour market as coercive rests on the claim that 
despite the formal equality of workers and employers as legal subjects within the 
market, power was distributed very unequally between workers and employers in 
a class-divided society. By virtue of their ownership of the means of production 
and the objects of labour, employers enjoyed a bundle of rights, privileges, powers, 
and immunities exercisable against non-owners, especially workers. For the 
purposes of this article, it is the rights and privileges that are most significant. 
Employers enjoy a legal privilege when they can choose between various courses 
"For similar views, see Francis Snyder and Douglas Hay, "Comparisons in the Social 
History of Law: Labour and Crime," in Frances Snyder and Douglas Hay, eds.. Labour, 
Law, and Crime: An Historical Perspective (London 1987), 1 and Alan Hunt "On Legal 
Relations and Economic Relations: A Critique of G.A. Cohen," reprinted in his Explorations 
in Law and Society (New York 1993), chap. 8. 
2The significance of the old coercion in the creation of capitalist labour markets has been 
recognized only recently. For example, see Karen Orren, Belated Feudalism (Cambridge 
1991) and Robert J. Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor: The Employment Relation in 
English and American Law and Culture, 1350-1870 (Chapel Hill 1991). 
^For England, see Daphne Simon, "Master and Servant" in John Saville, éd., Democracy 
and the Labour Movement, (London 1954), 160-200 and John V. Orth, Combination and 
Conspiracy: A Legal History of Trade Unionism, 1721-1906 (Oxford 1991). For Canada, 
see Paul Craven, The Law of Master and Servant in Mid-Nineteenth Century Ontario," in 
David Flaherty, ei.. Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Vol. 1 (Toronto 1981) 175-211 
and Tucker, 'That Indefinite Area of Toleration.'" 
^Wesley N. Hohfcld, "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning," Yale Law Journal, 23 (1913), 16-59. 
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of action and workers cannot call upon the state to stop them. Employers enjoy a 
legal right when they can choose between courses of action and can call upon the 
state to prevent workers from interfering with their choice. 
For example, at the very least, employers enjoyed a legal privilege to select 
and direct their workforces. At common law, employers' freedom to choose with 
whom to contract allowed them both to discriminate against potential employees 
on the basis of union membership or activity and to refuse to bargain with their 
employees other than on an individual basis. If current employees refused to work 
until their employers met their demands, the employer was at liberty to employ 
other workers (strikebreakers), often supplied by employment agencies. Private 
detectives could also be hired to root out union organizers and enforce blacklists.28 
Workers could not call upon the state to stop employers from doing any of these 
things. But the question remained: did employers enjoy a right to do these things 
in the sense that they could call upon the state to stop workers from interfering, in 
any way or in some ways, with, for example, their attempts to contract with 
strikebreakers? 
The law was not always clear about the scope of employer rights, especially 
when they were not contested. As long as employers did not aggressively assert 
their legal privilege to hire strikebreakers, there was no need to determine whether 
or not this hiring was also a legally protected right Also, to the extent that workers 
accepted the hegemony of employer privilege and did not interfere with their 
liberty, legal rights' claims did not need to be made by employers. Similarly, when 
employers were confident that market forces would put a stop to trade union 
interference with privileges, they were less likely to assert legal rights' claims. 
When, however, confrontations erupted and employer confidence wavered, em-
ployers, or their legal advisers, recognized that rights were more powerful than 
privileges, and that the enjoyment of legal rights depended upon the existence of 
a legal infrastructure provided by the state which would acknowledge and enforce 
their rights' claims to be free from interference. This created incentives to retain, 
create, and resort to directly coercive laws that imposed duties on workers not to 
interfere at all, or in particular ways, with their employers' actions. 
Even after much of the old coercive law had been repealed, criminal law 
continued to impose some limits on worker interference with employers' freedom 
of contract. Violence or the threat of violence was no more lawful in the context 
of strikes than it was elsewhere and, indeed, a Canadian statute passed in 1869 
imposed greater penalties for strike-related violence.29 Moreover, as the old coer-
28 
In some instances, particularly in mining, the employer also owned the homes and 
controlled the communities in which workers lived. This gave them extra leverage. Miners 
who went on strike could be evicted from company-owned housing and debts accrued by 
them at the company store functioned to restrict their mobility. See, for example, John 
Mellor, The Company Store (Halifax 1983). 
^S.C. 1869.C.20.S.42. 
FORGING RESPONSIBLE UNIONS 89 
cion was repealed, new offenses were created to limit strike activity. For instance, 
tactics such as picketing easily ran afoul of the new criminal prohibition against 
watching and Vn^»"g While the precise contours of the offense were contested, 
as judges disagreed over whether verbal taunts alone were sufficient or whether 
the threat of physical force was required, the possibility of conviction and incar-
ceration for workers found to have overstepped the bounds of legality was real.30 
Limits os lawful strike activity were not imposed exclusively through the 
criminal law. The common law, especially the law of tort, played an increasingly 
important role in the early 20th century as employers, with the active support of 
judges, began exploiting its more directly coercive possibilities. Employers sought 
injunctions and brought actions for damages against trade unions and their officers 
and members for strike-related activities. The courts held that striking workers were 
under a legal doty not to interfere with the right of employers to recruit and hire 
replacement workers. Striking workers were prohibited from inducing other work-
ers to breach their contracts of employment Judges also declared it to be unlawful 
for striking workers to organize consumer boycotts or to take action against other 
employers who continued to do business with the struck employer. Injunctions to 
stop immediately the workers' offending behaviour could be obtained expedi-
tiously from the courts and workers who violated their terms could be cited for 
contempt and punished. Damage actions threatened to bankrupt the union and, 
potentially, some of its members. 
Unionized workers resisted these legal claims and were able to limit the 
effectiveness of employer actions. Some judges were more tolerant of peaceful 
persuasion than others and the nature of trade unions as legal entities created 
difficulties in determining the precise legal basis for, and nature of, liability. 
Political campaigns for legislative redress were less successful, with the exception 
of British Columbia where legislation was enacted in 1902 giving trade unions 
immunity from many of the common law liabilities.31 
Because unlawful and, particularly, violent behaviour were seen to be illegiti-
mate by significant portions of the populace, its presence enabled state officials to 
justify the use of force. The militia and military, the Royal North West Mounted 
Police (RNWMP, later to become the Royal Canadian Mounted Police), and 
provincial and local police, including special constables sworn in for the occasion, 
were often mobilized in strikes on the ground that they were needed to enforce 
public order. In practice, this meant that employers who wished to continue 
operating during a strike and had the resources to bring in strikebreakers received 
a great deal of direct state assistance. 
As was the case when other coercive forms of law were used, the policing of 
strikes was contested. Local authorities directly responsible for maintaining civic 
3aTucker, "That Indefinite Area," 41-51 and Tucker, "The Faces of Coercion." 
31 An Act to amend the law relating to Trade Unions, S.B.C. 1902, c.66. Also, see references, 
infra., note 45. 
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order were not always in sympathy with the employer. This was particularly true 
of elected officials. When, however, local officials did act, they had a number of 
options. If local forces were inadequate for the task, officials could swear in special 
constables, but then they might have to pay for their services and could not always 
count on the professionalism or loyalty of new recruits. Perhaps to avoid such 
problems, officials sometimes hired men supplied by private detective agencies.32 
In some jurisdictions, requests could be directed to provincial governments for 
provincial police, but provincial officials were often hesitant to commit their forces, 
perhaps because they were concerned about the cost or because they wished to 
avoid becoming embroiled in local labour disputes unless an emergency situation 
clearly existed. In other provinces or territories, requests for additional police 
would be directed to the RNWMP. Finally, a request to the federal government for 
the deployment of the militia could be initiated by elected officials or police 
magistrates. While police magistrates may have had fewer qualms over calling in 
troops, the financial burden of doing so fell on the municipality. This may have 
inhibited local officials. Indeed, because of the high incidence of local defaults, 
after 1904 the federal government began to require municipalities to make a down 
payment of costs before they agreed to deploy the militia. 
Once the police or militia was on the scene, further decisions had to be taken 
in respect of what actions in support of the strike would be tolerated and how the 
police would achieve their objectives. Certainly, the employers' property and 
strikebreakers would be protected from violence, but the extent to which other 
actions in support of the strike would be permitted and more repressive police 
measures would be taken depended on a variety of circumstances. One conclusion, 
however, is clear. Canadian police and militia used lethal force far less frequently 
than their American counterparts.33 
For example, during the 1907 strike by silver miners in Cobalt, ON, local officials swore 
in special constables recruited locally and supplied by the Canadian Detective Bureau. The 
Ontario government paid for the private detectives. See Ontario Archives (OA), RG 4-32, 
file 1907/996. In some instances, mine owners paid for specials. For example, see OA, RG 
4-32, file 1914/179. More research is required on who underwrote the costs of policing 
strikes. 
For example, in Ontario, requests from local officials for provincial police assistance in 
strikes were commonly resisted both by the Attorney-General's department and by Joseph 
Rogers, the first Superintendent of the Ontario Provincial Police (established by order-in-
council in 1909). For a discussion of the role of the British Columbia Provincial Police in 
this area, see Lynne Stonier-Newman, Policing a Pioneer Province (Madeira Park, BC 
1991), 75-76, 81-81, and 98-107. 
Desmond Morton, "Aid to Civil Power The Canadian Militia in Support of Social Order, 
1867-1914," Canadian Historical Review, 51 (1970), 407-25, at 422. 
Tor a particularly useful discussion of policing issues, see William M. Baker, "The Miners 
and the Mounties: The Royal North West Mounted Police and the 1906 Lethbridge Strike," 
Labour/Le Travail, 27 (1991), 55-96. Despite its failure to properly emphasize the role of 
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One further way the state directly intervened to shape the market to favour 
employers was through immigration law. Constituting a labour market in Canada 
required immigration and the state played an active role in recruiting workers, 
mostly from Britain. Employers had an active interest in promoting high levels of 
immigration to create a well-stocked, competitive labour market to hold down wage 
demands and to provide a pool of replacement workers in the event of a strike. 
Workers understood the significance of immigration policy for their labour 
market position and opposed active state recruitment policies, generally with little 
success. However, when the United States limited the ability of Canadian workers 
to obtain employment in its territory, Parliament was eventually persuaded to pass 
retaliatory legislation in 1897. The Alien Labour Act prohibited the importation of 
foreign workers under contract from countries which placed similar restrictions on 
Canadian workers. Although the legislation was not passed to protect striking 
Canadian workers from having their jobs taken by imported American strikebreak-
ers, it would have this effect if enforced. This protective potential, however, was 
not realized. Despite the efforts of organized labour, few employers were prose-
cuted for violations of the Act. Moreover, the employers' privilege to contract with 
strikebreakers from the United Kingdom was unimpaired, as was their privilege 
and right to contract with other workers presently in Canada.36 
Immigration law, in addition to limiting or expanding the number of available 
workers, was also used for directly political purposes. The law was amended in 
1906,1910, and 1919 to enhance the power of the Department of Immigration to 
prevent foreign organizers and agitators from entering the country and to deport 
resident aliens who were deemed to have become undesirable because of then-
radical political activities in Canada. These powers were exercised more fre-
quently, however, after the period we are concerned with here.37 
The oblique coercion of market-constituting and market-shaping law and the 
direct coercion of exclusions and deportations, injunctions, criminal prosecutions, 
and police and the militia did not exhaust the role of law in respect of relations 
between workers and employers. Facilitative law and, to a lesser extent, protective 
law also played increasingly important roles.38 
state violence, a useful description of American labour violence is Philip Taft and Philip 
Ross, "American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character, and Outcome," in Hugh Davis 
Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Violence in American: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives, Vol. 1, (Washington 1969), 221-301. 
^"he background to and early operation of the Alien Labour Act is discussed in Eric Tucker, 
"Suspended Between Two Worlds: Law and Strikes in Ontario, 1890-1900," (unpublished 
manuscript, 1993). For a more general discussion of immigration and labour, see Donald 
Avery, Dangerous Foreigners (Toronto 1979). 
37On deportations, see Barbara Roberts, Whence They Came (Ottawa 1988). 
38Prior to 1914, the most common form of protective legislation addressed dangerous work 
conditions, especially for women and children, and the consequences of disabling work-re-
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State interest in the creation of mechanisms to facilitate the resolution of labour 
disputes through various forms of state-sponsored mediation, conciliation, or 
arbitration was first expressed legislatively at the same time the "old" coercion was 
being repealed. A trade dispute arbitration scheme was enacted in Ontario in 1873, 
but was completely moribund. In the last two decades of the 19th century, Nova 
Scotia, British Columbia, and Ontario enacted further measures using somewhat 
different approaches, but none of them gained widespread acceptance. 
Although the federal government first became involved in mediating strikes 
toward the end of the 19th century on an ad hoc basis, it was only in 1900 that it 
created a statutory framework and permanent institutional structure through which 
it could act. The Conciliation Act, passed in 1900, not only allowed for voluntary 
creation of conciliation boards, but also allowed cabinet to appoint a commissioner 
to hold an inquiry and established a Department of Labour responsible for the 
collection and publication of labour statistics and information in the Labour 
Gazette f° This was later followed by the Railway Labour Disputes Act in 1903 and 
the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA) in 1907 which became the cen-
trepiece of Canadian labour law until World War II.41 
The IDIA was justified on the ground that in industries crucial to the national 
economic policy, coal included, private rights should give way to the public 
women came later. The role of protective legislation is not considered in this article. For an 
overview, see Margaret McCallum, "Regulating the Employment Relationship: 1867-
1920," University of Manitoba, Canadian Legal History Project, Working Paper Series, 
92-8. 
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Mowat Era," Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 6 (1991), 65-90. On the others, see 
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Nova Scotia (Toronto 1990), 303-25 and Tucker, "Between Two Worlds." Some provinces, 
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Legislation Designed to Foster Industrial Peace in the Common Law Jurisdictions of 
Canada," PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 1954. 
Conciliation Act, S.C. 1900, c.24. On the origins and operation of this scheme, see Jeremy 
Webber, "Compelling Compromise: Canada Chooses Conciliation over Arbitration, 1900-
1907," Labour/U Travail, 28 (1991), 15-57; and Bob Russell, Back to Work? (Scarborough 
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The literature on the creation of these federal schemes is voluminous. Paul Craven, 'An 
Impartial Umpire': Industrial Relations and the Canadian State 1900-1911 (Toronto 1980) 
and Webber, "Compelling Compromise," contain the best discussions. Provincial govern-
ments also created similar mechanisms in the period under study. For example, bureaus of 
labour with responsibility for gathering statistics in respect of labour disputes were created 
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Provincial conciliation and arbitration legislation was enacted in Quebec (1901), Nova 
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interest The legislation established a mechanism for appointing conciliation boards 
to investigate a dispute, attempt to settle it, and issue a report These reports served 
to provide a template of legitimate demands against which the parties' behaviour 
could be measured. Union demands for a closed shop were considered illegitimate, 
but so too were claims by employers mat they had a right to dismiss employees 
because of trade union membership. Disputes over union recognition were regarded 
as particularly unsusceptible to settlement and conciliation board reports often 
urged unions to compromise on this issue. On occasion, board reports also con-
demned specific unions, invoking the fear of foreign agitators in doing so.42 While 
these reports may have provided ammunition to the parties, their ideological 
effectiveness is questionable, as "illegitimate'' demands continued to be regularly 
made by the parties to disputes. 
The IDIA 's effect however, was not exclusively ideological and facilitative, 
nor was it meant to be. The legislation provided access to criminal sanctions in the 
event that anyone violated the ban on the use of economic weapons until after the 
conciliation board had issued its report Violators were liable to be incarcerated. 
What is significant about the enforcement of these sanctions is that the federal 
government explicitly abstained from prosecuting violations of the IDIA and, 
essentially, delegated the initiation of its criminal law power to the parties. When 
employers prosecuted union organizers for calling and supporting strikes in viola-
tion of the Act the courts read the statutory restrictions broadly. Union officials 
were convicted for participating in strikes where neither party had invoked the Act 
and for providing food and other benefits to miners striking in violation of it. The 
deterence of untimely action largely benefited employers by giving them additional 
time to organize strikebreakers.43 
42Jeremy Webber, "Standards of Industrial Justice: Ideology and the Reports of Conciliation 
Boards Under the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act 1907-1925," LLM Thesis, York 
University, 1988,173-188. For a seminal articulation of this model of responsible unionism, 
see Canada, Royal Commission on Industrial Disputes in the Province of British Columbia, 
Report, Sessional Papers, #36a (1903). Its background is discussed in Craven, Impartial 
Umpire, 247-52. 
It did not take long for the coercive component of the IDIA to be invoked. Silver miners 
in Cobalt, Ontario, organized by the Western Federation of Miners, struck in July 1907. 
Even though neither party had invoked the Act the courts upheld the conviction of James 
McGuire for unlawfully inciting the employees of the Nipissing Mining Company to go on 
strike. He was fined $500 and sentenced to six months imprisonment in default of payment. 
The penalty was reduced to three months on appeal. After the conviction was upheld the 
employer proceeded with private prosecutions against three other strike leaders. Rex v. 
McGuire (1908), 16 O.L.R. 522 (D.C.) and OA, RG 4-32, Files 1907/969 and 1907/1393. 
On the prosecution of trade unionists for providing support to illegal strikers, see Report of 
the Deputy Minister of Labour on Industrial Conditions in the Coal Fields of Nova Scotia, 
Sessional Paper. No. 36a (1909), 21-2 and The King v. Neilson, (1910), 17 C.C.C. 298. 
94 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 
In sum, industrial relations were institutionalized through a wide array of legal 
instruments, administered by judges and other state officials, that could serve a 
variety of purposes. At its core was a capitalist labour market, constituted and 
shaped by law. But, the system was flexible and provided employers and state 
officials with a wide range of options in the event of labour conflicts. The level and 
kinds of direct and indirect coercion varied, as did the extent and nature of 
facilitative interventions. Of course, resort to legal devices in labour disputes was 
not a one-way street, but union traffic was much lighter. Much of the unions' 
engagement with law was defensive. They resisted extravagant rights' claims of 
employers in an attempt to preserve some scope for trade union activity; that is, 
they defended their own privileges and freedom. 
In the following case study, we closely examine the development of one aspect 
of the legal regime, the labour injunction, and its use and effect in one particular 
context, skilled metal workers employed in large firms. The legal response to these 
strikes was not "typical." For example, strikes by coal and metal miners frequently 
were subject to "compulsory conciliation" under the IDIA and direct state repres-
sion through the massive deployment of police and militia, responses that were not 
seen in the strikes that are die subject of this article.44 Yet, they were important 
arenas of struggle over the institutionalization of class relations and their repre-
sentation in legal and public discourse. 
Skilled Metal Workers and the Law of Picketing and Boycotts 
DURING THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, employers challenged the 
working conditions, labour process control, and organizational solidarity of craft 
workers. Inevitably, this produced strikes and lockouts as workers resisted employ-
ers' efforts to reshape production. Of particular interest is the conflict that erupted 
between the metal workers of southern Ontario and large employers, for it was in 
this crucible that Canadian employers experimented with legal actions for injunc-
tions and damages as a response to picketing and boycotts, the two major strike 
weapons of skilled workers.43 But the metal workers' tradition of solidarity and 
^ t i e comparison is more fully developed in Fudge and Tucker, "The Contexts of Coer-
cion." 
45For a good overview of the context of strikes of the skilled during this period, see Craig 
Heron and Bryan D. Palmer, "Through the Prism of the Strike: Industrial Conflict in 
Southern Ontario, 1901-14," Canadian Historical Review, 58 (1977), 423-58. To be sure, 
injunctions were not used exclusively by employers of skilled labour. The earliest reported 
case of a labour injunction involved an action by the LeRoi Mining Co. against the Western 
Federation of Miners at Rossland, British Columbia. That litigation raised many of the same 
legal questions that were crucial to the injunctions against metal workers in Ontario. The 
major difference between injunctions in mining strikes and those involving skilled industrial 
workers was the context in which they were applied. Mining strikes typically involved both 
large numbers of strikers and strikebreakers and, as a result, policing played a more 
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organization, and the continued demand for their skills, left them in a better position 
to contest their employers' initiatives than many other workers. This context shaped 
the strategies and tactics, both legal and other, of the employers and the unions in 
their struggles. 
The metal trades included a minority of highly skilled workers (eg. pattern 
makers, moulders, and machinists) and much greater numbers of semi-skilled 
workers (eg. polishers and stovemounters) and unskilled labourers. For the most 
skilled, craft unionism had deep roots and the ideals of worker autonomy and 
control were strongly held and maintained in practice. During the 19th century, for 
example, conflicts erupted regularly when employers attempted to force moulders 
to take on more apprentices than their rules allowed or to work with unskilled 
'bucks' or with non-union moulders. In Toronto, the moulders emerged victorious 
more often man not, even though a number of their employers — and especially 
Edward Gurney — invoked the criminal law in the course of some disputes. 
Throughout much of this period, the moulders maintained a high level of solidarity, 
not just with other moulders but with other, less skilled, metal trades' workers. For 
example, in 1887 the Ontario branches of the International Moulders Union (IMU) 
formed a district union to coordinate their activities. In 1887 when Gurney locked 
out moulders in Toronto, moulders at his Hamilton works walked out in sympathy 
and, a year earlier, moulders at die Massey agricultural implements works in 
Toronto put down their tools in support of striking labourers organized by the 
Knights of Labor. The economic downturn which lasted from the late 1880s to the 
mid-1890s, however, provided Gurney and Massey with the opportunity to suc-
cessfully attack the IMU, resulting in a number of protracted strikes and lockouts 
in the early 1890s.46 
Their victory, however, was short-lived. The IMU regained strength with the 
return of industrial prosperity and the number of metal-based union locals in 
southern Ontario increased from 16 in 1896 to 75 in 1902. More generally, trade 
union organization, most of it associated with American internationals, reached 
unprecedented levels during these years. A high level of cross-craft solidarity was 
achieved within the metal trades and sympathy strikes became common. In Toronto 
prominent role. On Rossland, see A.W.R. Carrothers, "A Legislative History of the B.C. 
Trade-unions Act: The Rossland Miners' Case," U.B.C. Legal Notes, 2 (1956), 339-46; A. 
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Mouat, The Genesis of Western Exceptionalism: British Columbia's Hardrock Miners, 
1895-1903," Canadian Historical Review, 81 (1990), 317-45 and Michael Ripmeester, 
"Mines, Homes, and Halls: Place and Identity as a Gold Miner in Rossland, British 
Columbia, 1898-1901," Canadian Geographer, 38 (1994), 98-110. 
^Gregory S. Kealey, Toronto Workers Respond to Industrial Capitalism 1867-1892 
(Toronto 1980), 64-82,198. 
96 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 
a federated metal trades council was formed in 1901 to coordinate the activities of 
the various trades.47 
Employers, especially large ones, did not sit back and passively watch these 
developments. The expansion of the economy created new opportunities for profit 
but, to take full advantage of them, many industrial employers felt the need to 
loosen the constraints skilled workers placed upon them. In particular, their high 
cost, control of production, and independence were seen as obstacles to be over-
come. Employers sought to do so by reducing the need for skilled workers in 
production and by attacking their organizational strength.48 Employers also under-
stood the need for cooperation among themselves and established both continental 
and local organizations to assist them in pursuing their common objectives. The 
National Founders Association (NFA), for example, was formed in 1898 and, 
although it worked amicably with the IMU nationally during its first years, locally 
conflict remained high. Employers in Toronto formed an association in 1902 to 
assist members facing labour trouble. Their leaders included W.H. Carrick of the 
Gumey foundry and Frank Poison, also a well-known local foundry owner.49 
In short, at the turn of the century, well-organized workers, aided by a tight 
labour market, confronted organized employers committed to expanding their 
control over the labour process. In retrospect, it is not surprising that, when a wave 
of strikes swept through the metal industry, employers sought to re-shape the terrain 
on which such conflicts would be conducted. Resort to civil law was one part of 
this campaign. 
The first strike erupted when Massey-Harris introduced moulding machines 
into its Toronto factory. The union demanded that the machines be placed under 
47Wayne Roberts, 'Toronto Metal Workers and the Second Industrial Revolution, 1889-
1914," Labour/Le Travail, 6 (1980), 49-72. On the growth of the international unions in 
Canada, see Robert H. Babcock, Gompers in Canada: A Study of American Continentalism 
before the First World War (Toronto 1974), 38-54 and for a general history of the IMU, see 
Frank T. Stockton, The International Moulders Union of North America (Johns Hopkins 
University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series XXXIX, No. 3) (Baltimore, 
1921). 
For an overview of developments, see Craig Heron, "The Second Industrial Revolution 
in Canada, 1890-1930," in Deian Hopkin and Gregory Kealey, eds., Class, Community, and 
the Labour Movement: Wales and Canada 1850-1930 (Wales 1989), 48-66. On metal 
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Deadly Dust (Princeton 1991), 49-62. 
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its jurisdiction and, when management refused, 80 to 90 moulders, members of 
IMU Local 28, struck on 3 February 1900. Seventeen days later, 45 moulders, 
members of IMU Local 29 at Massey's Brantford works, went out in sympathy. 
The Brantford Laborers Protective Union, Local 7370 of the American Federation 
of Labor, also struck, ahhough it is unclear bow many employees of Massey were 
members. 
The tactics employed by the strikers at both locations were die traditional ones. 
Pickets were sent to watch die factory, neighbourhood, and railway stations. Their 
objective was to intercept men working as moulders during the strike or potential 
recruits and persuade them not work. Their means of persuasion varied, ranging 
from appeals to solidarity, offers to provide assistance in finding work elsewhere, 
monetary payments, verbal abuse, and physical intimidation. It is important to note, 
however, that mass picketing and confrontations between large groups of strikers 
and replacements was not a feature of these strikes. Moulders made up only a tiny 
fraction of the workforce (80 out of 1200 workers in Massey's Toronto factory and 
45 out of 700 in Brantford) and so die number of striking and replacement workers 
was relatively small. Moreover, most strikers did not remain on die scene for long 
because die union, which paid a strike benefit, encouraged diem to find work 
elsewhere. Only a few workers, generally union officers and strike leaders, kept up 
strike activities. 
At this time, die boundaries of lawful strike activity were defined almost 
exclusively through the criminal law. Under die Criminal Code, it was an offence 
for a person to "wrongfully and without legal authority, with a view to compel any 
other person to abstain from doing anything which he has a lawful right to do...," 
use violence, intimidate, persistently follow or watch and beset. Prior to die 
codification of Canadian criminal law in 1892, die applicable statute was modelled 
on English law and stipulated that peaceful communication of information did not 
constitute watching and besetting. For reasons mat have not been fully explained, 
this proviso was removed when die Code was enacted. Thus, while it was clear that 
physical assaults and intimidation were criminal, die limits on verbal persuasion 
were less certain. Some judicial pronouncements in prosecutions under die Code 
in the 1890s suggested that die omission of die peaceful communication exemption 
made all forms of picketing criminal watching and besetting, but this interpretation 
was not generally accepted.30 
If Massey had followed past practice, striking workers who participated in 
more aggressive forms of picketing would have been charged with criminal 
offenses. Where minor offenses were involved, strikers would have been tried 
summarily before local magistrates who, very likely, would have convicted diem 
but only imposed nominal fines and warned that future offenders would be treated 
much more harshly. More serious charges would be tried before a jury, weeks or 
months after die arrest Massey, however, adopted a different legal strategy, one 
''Wker, "Between Two Worlds.'* 
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which had been attempted only one other time in Canada, seventeen years earlier, 
and then forgotten.31 It commenced civil legal actions in superior courts against 
named workers and the local unions involved, seeking injunctions and damages.32 
The immediate inspiration for this new approach came from England. In the 
early 1890s, English judges began to fashion new economic torts designed to 
protect employers against the kinds of harm that strikes aimed to cause. Interfer-
ences with existing contracts or with the formation of future contracts were held to 
be actionable wrongs without any defence of justification. Picketing to persuade 
non-striking workers to leave or potential recruits not to take up employment, even 
when not accompanied by violence or the threat of violence, was also found to be 
tortious. Taken at its strongest, the effect of these judgements was to render 
wrongful almost any communication between strikers and current or potential 
strikebreakers. Moreover, the cases made it clear that interlocutory injunctions 
could be issued whenever a prima facie case of illegality was made out and grave 
damage to the employer was threatened. No longer, it seemed, did the plaintiff have 
to establish there would be damage to property; alternatively, the right to trade was 
treated as a property interest. In short, interim injunctions seemed to be issued 
whenever the balance of convenience favoured them and, for most judges, the 
balance of convenience clearly tilted in favour of allowing the employer to continue 
operations with as little hindrance as possible.3 
The Massey actions were modelled on a reading of the English case law as it 
stood at the time. Not only did Massey seek to prohibit molestation and intimida-
tion; it also wanted to prohibit any attempt, verbal or otherwise, to dissuade 
employees or would-be employees from continuing or taking up employment. The 
affidavits filed in support of the applications for ex parte injunctions referred to 
pickets intercepting strikebreakers and potential strikebreakers with the result that 
they either left or did not take up employment with the company. Allegations of 
5lHynes v. Fisher et al. (1883), 4 O.R. 60, discussed extensively in Tucker, "The Faces of 
Coercion," 284-95. 
The power to issue injunctions was exercised exclusively by superior court judges. 
The literature on the English law is voluminous. For an introduction, see A.WJ. 
Thompson, "The Injunction in Trade Disputes in Britain before 1910," Industrial and 
Labour Relations Review, 19 (1965-66), 213-23; J. Saville, 'Trade Unions and Free Labour 
The Background to the Taff Vale Decision," in M.W. Flynn and T.C. Smout, eds., Essays 
in Social History (Oxford 1974), 251-76; and Michael J. Klarman, The Judges Versus the 
Unions: The Development of British Labor Law, 1867-1913," Virginia Law Review, 75 
(1989), 1487-1602. The application of the balance of convenience approach to the benefit 
of employers is clearly seen in Small v. American Federation of Musicians (1903), 2 O.W.R. 
33. In that case, Chancellor Boyd continued an injunction against the union until trial, 
commenting (at 34): "it is more convenient in the interests of the plaintiff to have the present 
orchestra continued in his employment till the trial than to have any interruption or 
discontinuance by the active intervention of the defendants; and this course will be in no 
wise [sic] detrimental to defendants.... " 
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intimidation were made, but little evidence was offered in the affidavits to support 
the claim. As well, the affidavits emphasized mat Massey stood to lose a great deal 
if its moulding departments were unable to operate while the defendants stood to 
lose nothing if the injunction was granted.94 
The process was an expeditious one that worked in favour of the employer. 
Broadly worded injunctions were granted by the court on the day the action was 
commenced, solely on the basis of the affidavits filed by Massey.55 Examinations 
of the defendants under oath followed, and this gave Massey the opportunity to 
explore the internal operations of the union. When some union officers refused to 
answer questions, ostensibly because they feared criminal prosecution, lawyers for 
Massey sought to have mem jailed for contempt, but their motion was refused when 
the defendants indicated they would answer questions if directed to do so by the 
court The injunctions were continued while die legal wrangling dragged on, and 
no juries were involved in these interlocutory proceedings. 
Beyond the substantive limits on strike tactics, the case raised important 
questions about the legal status of trade unions: did they have a legal personality 
distinct from that of their members so that they could be parties to legal proceedings 
in their own name and could trade union funds ultimately be seized in the event 
damages were awarded? At the time of the Massey actions, die issue had not been 
settled, but the predominant understanding was that unions were not suable 
entities.56 Not surprisingly, then, solicitors for the union brought a motion to have 
it struck from the list of defendants. Further affidavits and examinations followed. 
Argument was heard by Mr. Justice R.M. Meredith on 7 March 1900 both on the 
question of trade union status and on whether or not the injunctions should be 
continued until trial which would be months away. G.H. Watson Q.C. appeared for 
Massey-Harris.57 He argued that the union and its officers should be held liable for 
any unlawful actions of its members because, he alleged, it was a corporate body 
and was engaged in a conspiracy to interfere with the company's employees. E.F.B. 
Johnson Q.C. appeared for the union and other defendants. He denied the existence 
of a conspiracy and asserted that the decision to strike had been made by the men 
employed by Massey, not the union. To the extent that individuals had committed 
unlawful acts, Johnson conceded that the injunction should continue as against 
them personally but, he argued, neither the trade union nor its officers could be 
held liable for those actions. Moreover, he established, apparently to the court's 
"See OA. RG 22, York County SCO, Action File 201/1900 (Massey v. Woodward et al.) and 
Action File 214/1900 (Massey v. Lavis et al.). (Hereafter all court files will be cited to Action 
File # only). 
5nThe scope of the writs does not appear to have been quite as far reaching as what was 
requested. Globe (Toronto), 24 February 1900,26, col.3. 
^aff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] A.C. 436, the 
most important case on the issue, was still working its way through the lower courts. 
G.H. Watson was a senior member of the bar with a large commençai practice. See Henry 
James Morgan, éd., Canadian Men and Women of the Tune, 2d éd., (Toronto 1912). 
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satisfaction, that the union was neither incorporated nor registered and, therefore, 
had no legal existence. Judge R.M. Meredith reserved judgement38 Two weeks 
later, he issued his decision. Meredith held that if the acts complained of were 
committed by the defendants they violated the Criminal Code. The evidence 
established a prima facie case that organized means were adopted to interfere with 
die employees. The injunction, therefore, was continued He also found that, prima 
facie, the Iron Moulders Union lias some legal existence" so that it could be made 
a party to the case, although the matter would be dealt with at trial.59 
The injunctions did not end either strike immediately, but the responses to it 
differed sharply in Toronto and Brentford. In Toronto there were no further reports 
of interference by strikers or legal action on die part of Massey. Indeed, in 
November a motion was brought by Massey to stay the proceedings on die ground 
mat die subject matter of die dispute ceased to exist as all striking moulders were 
employed elsewhere.60 Events in Brantford followed a different course. Strikers 
persisted in attempting to dissuade strikebreakers and recruits from continuing or 
taking employment. This produced three motions to commit strikers to gaol for 
breaching die injunction, a flurry of affidavits, and hundreds of pages of transcripts 
of cross-examinations on the affidavits. In respect of two of these motions, consent 
agreements were reached to defer die matter to die trial of die action upon die 
defendants undertaking diat there would be no further breaches.61 On die other 
motion, oral argument to commit began but ran into difficulty. The evidence 
indicated diat, while strike leaders continued to communicate widi potential 
recruits, there was no intimidation. Chief Justice William Ralph Meredith (older 
brother of Judge R.M. Meredith) indicated his lack of sympatiiy widi die interpre-
tation of die scope of die restraint being asserted by Massey. 
Surely the injunction does not prevent the strikers from doing that If so, liberty is at an end 
in this country. I would not commit the men for that. They have a perfect right to expostulate 
with, but not intimidate, any persons coming to take their places. Have men not a right to 
tell outers of die oppressive treatment of any company, and mus induce them not to enter its 
employ?62 
Watson, die lawyer for die plaintiff, referred to recent English cases to support his 
claim diat even diis communication was prohibited, and argued diat Judge R.M. 
Meredidi had relied upon tiiese precedents in his earlier decision. Argument on die 
motion was adjourned and no decision ever issued. Ultimately, Massey discontin-
5*Globe, 8 March 1900,4, col.2-3. 
^Globe, 21 March 1900,5, col.2. 
« ^ e motion was denied (Globe, 16 November 1900,7, col. 1-2) and costs were awarded 
to the defendants in any event The court file contains no documents beyond this motion, 
suggesting diat die matter was settled or dropped. 
6lGlobe, I June 1900,7, col.3 and 28 November 1900,5, col.l. 
aGlobe, 11 July 1900. 
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ued its action as against die two trade unions and, after pleadings were filed and 
die case against die named individuals was set down for trial, die parties settled out 
of court in April 1901.63 
Thus, at die end of die day, neidier die legal status of trade unions nor die 
precise limits on die privileges of strikers had been resolved by die Massey actions. 
There was no unanimity on diese issues, even between diese brother judges. 
William Ralph, long known as a friend of die workmgman, wanted to preserve 
some scope for peaceful communication, while his brother Richard Martin, was 
keen to impose extremely tight restrictions on strike-related activity. He was of die 
view that all picketing involved an aspect of compulsion and, mus, was en-
joinable.64 Despite die unsettled state of die law, a new weapon had been added to 
die employers' arsenal. Employers could obtain, summarily, court orders prohib-
iting strike activity diat previously had been generally considered lawful and, even 
though die precise restrictions were uncertain, strikers could be kept on die 
defensive. Contacts between strikers and replacement workers or potential recruits 
had to be handled more delicately than tbey had been in die past Moreover, die 
activities of die Brantford strikers were closely monitored by Massey. It docu-
mented every arguable breach of die injunction witii affidavits and filed motions 
to commit for contempt which entitled its lawyers to examine, at length, die alleged 
violators under oath. 
^Brantford Courier, 9 April 1901,1. coL3. 
64WilHam Ralph Meredith was leader of the conservative opposition in Ontario through 
much of the Mowat era. Nevertheless, be maintained close ties with the labour movement 
and actively supported a number of their causes including universal male suffrage and reform 
of employers' liability law. He is, perhaps, best known for his role in die creation of modern 
workers' compensation systems. See R.C.B. Risk, "This Nuisance of Litigation': The 
Origins of Workers' Compensation in Ontario,'' in David Flaherty, éd., Essays in the History 
of Canadian Law, Vol. 1, (Toronto 1983), 418-91. Richard Martin Meredith was appointed 
to the bench out of practice and consistently took the employers side in labour injunction 
and employer liability cases. Kirk Stevens, The Ontario Courts and Employers' Liability, 
1900-1913,'' unpublished Osgoode Hall Law School seminar paper, 1984, on file with 
authors. The stricter interpretation subsequently received support from Mathers in Cotter v. 
Osborne (1908), 8 W.L.R. 4SI (Man. S.C.). upheld in (1909), 18 Man. R. 471 (C.A.), and 
in Vulcan Iron Works Co. v. Winnipeg Lodge, No. 174, Ironmoulders Union (1909), 10 
W.L.R. 421, upheld in (1911), 16 W.L.R. 649 (Man. C.A.) (picketing held to be a common 
law nuisance). Also, see the decision of R.M. Meredith in Krug Furniture Co. v. Berlin 
Union of Amalgamated Woodworkers (1903), 5 O.L.R. 463. 
6SThe legality of another common trade union tactic to discourage replacement workers — 
placing ads in newspapers calling upon other members of their craft to keep away because 
of a strike — was also attacked. When this tactic was used in a strike against the John Dixon 
Carriage Works in Toronto, the Toronto Employers Association intervened and all the 
newspapers involved, except die Globe, agreed to withdraw die warning and not to accept 
future ones. An interim injunction was obtained to compel the Globe to refrain from 
publishing die notice. /C, December 1905,288-9. 
102 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 
In addition to these immediate and instrumental advantages, Massey made 
progress on the ideological front by portraying the unions as bodies that interfered 
with the rights of other workers to sell their labour freely. Although the strikers and 
trade union officials were partially successful in resisting this image by asserting 
their liberal right to free speech, they were unable to put their employer into a 
defensive posture by painting a picture of Massey as a dangerous tyrant Thus, 
while the law did not fully embrace and inscribe the employers' ideal of a "free" 
labour market, it provided employers with additional leverage, material and moral, 
in their struggle to restrict and delegitimate strike activity. 
In addition to civil actions, employers of skilled labour developed two other 
techniques to minimize the effectiveness of traditional strike tactics. They im-
proved their organizational capacity to break strikes and sought to have the criminal 
law regarding picketing more strictly applied. 
The impact of improved employer organization on strikes in the metal trades 
can be seen most clearly in the dispute at Canada Foundry that erupted in June 
1903. This strike was part of a larger campaign for a nine-hour day, involving 275 
moulders at 11 Toronto firms.67 Most of the smaller shops had conceded earlier, 
but Canada Foundry, with support and guidance from the NFA and the TEA, led 
the larger firms in resisting the moulders' demands. 
Canada Foundry obtained professional scab moulders from the NFA, which 
kept a number of moulders under yearly contract precisely for this purpose. Of 
course, importing moulders from the United States under contract violated the Alien 
Labour Act, but this would not have deterred Canada Foundry since the Act was 
weakly enforced.69 Another 90 or so moulders who had been hired in Scotland and 
Britain, allegedly with government assistance and without being told of the strike, 
arrived in Toronto in July. Another 80 followed later.70 Canada Foundry hired 
Noble's Dominion Detective Agency to provide security and to monitor the IMU's 
activities, possibly even planting a detective in the union. They also hired James 
On the employers' use of the imagery of the free labour market and free labourers, see Ian 
McKay, "Strikes in the Maritimes, 1901-1914," Acadiensis, 13 (1983), 3-46 and Saville, 
"Trade Unions." 
67Roberts, 'Toronto Metal Workers," 67. 
^ h e discussion generally draws on the material in Canada Foundry v. Emmett et al., Action 
File 860/1903. On the strikebreaking tactics of the NFA, see Bonnett, Employers ' Associa-
tions, 74-83. In addition to the use of NFA moulders, the tactics of Canada Foundry seem to 
have been closely modelled on the NFA plan of action. 
'"The Alien Labour Act permitted the importation of skilled workers under contract in 
restricted circumstances that likely did not apply here. 
^Some of the "old world" moulders joined a protest to the provincial premier, George Ross 
who denied that provincial immigration agents had been involved. In addition to material in 
the Action File, see Labour Gazette (LG), August 1903, 114-5 and 151-4. On organized 
overseas recruiting of skilled workers, see Heron and Palmer, "Prism," 4S3-5. 
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Ford, a Toronto police constable. In addition to patrolling the area around the plant, 
he ran a boarding bouse established by Canada Foundry for its scab moulders. 
All mis surveillance, plus the arrest of three strikers (two for loitering and one 
for intimidation) did not prevent some of the imported workers from quitting. As 
a result, Canada Foundry sought and obtained an injunction in early September. 
But scab moulders continued to quit, and so a scheme was hatched to induce a 
breach of the injunction. Some of the professional strikebreakers pretended to be 
disgruntled Canada Foundry employees wishing to quit When the strikers offered 
them assistance to leave the city, Canada Foundry brought a motion to commit for 
contempt In the examinations on the affidavits that followed, the plot was revealed 
and the striking moulders brought a motion to commit those involved in the scheme 
for inducing breaches of the injunction. 
The moulder's motion was heard first Chief Justice Meredith dismissed it on 
the ground that no breach of the injunction had in fact occurred. The evidence 
showed that the strikers had offered assistance only after the professional scabs 
indicated that they wished to leave. Indeed, the scabs had each signed statements 
before receiving money from the union stating, This is to certify that I have of my 
own free will without fear of molestation or intimidation requested the moulders 
Union to help me out of the City." Following his reasoning in the Massey-Harris 
case, Meredith C J. drew a sharp line between "inciting" an employee to leave and 
assisting one who had already made the decision.72 
Several weeks later, Chancellor Boyd heard the employer's motion and 
dismissed i t In part, he relied on the equitable maxim that to get equity you must 
come into court with clean hands. With respect to other incidents relied upon in the 
motion, Boyd showed little patience for the employer's argument "I decline to 
wade through the mass of papers in order to find out what may be the residuum of 
all the facts, conversations, surmises, and information which has been collected 
from a host of witnesses."73 
Even though this particular motion failed, because some superior court judges 
had neither the patience for employer intrigues nor the desire to act as their agents 
for the purpose of punishing workers, this aggressive American strategy, imported 
into Canada through continental employer associations, undermined the ability of 
unionized workers to win strikes based on their partial monopoly of skill, supple-
It appears that none of the men were convicted and that the two men charged with loitering 
subsequently entered suits against Canada Foundry for assault and false imprisonment. See 
LG, August 1903,152. 
nCanada Foundry Co. v. Emmett (1903), 2 O.W.R. 1032. The union subsequently charged 
the scabs with obtaining money under false pretences. They were convicted and the money 
paid them was returned to the union. Industrial Banner (IB ), October 1905.2, col.4. 
^Canada Foundry Co. v. Emmett (1903), 2 O.W.R. 1102 at 1103. 
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mented by picketing. Despite battling their employers to a legal stalemate the 
moulders lost the strike against Canada Foundry. 4 
A third component of employers' efforts to reduce the effectiveness of tradi-
tional strike tactics by skilled metal workers was a more aggressive use of the 
criminal law. However, for this strategy to be effective, judges had to interpret and 
apply the law more stringently. Not all judges were willing to do so. One legal issue 
was whether or not workers charged with picketing offenses were entitled to trial 
by jury. Some magistrates, most notably Magistrate Denison in Toronto, took the 
view that the accused had no right to elect trial by jury and that a magistrate could 
decide to proceed summarily.73 Eliminating trial by jury not only allowed employ-
ers to get criminal sanctions imposed quickly, but it also increased the chance of 
securing a conviction. This was because some magistrates were clearly hostile to 
trade union activity and because activities giving rise to criminal charges heard in 
the heat of a strike were more likely to be seen as serious disruptions of public 
order, requiring swift action. Although it is not clear whether or not Denison's 
interpretation of the law was widely followed, it was not until 1905 that the Code 
was clarified — at the urging of the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) — to 
guarantee the right of the accused to elect trial by jury.76 
A second issue was the scope of watching and besetting. Some lower court 
judges and magistrates began treating any form of picketing as the offence of 
watching and besetting. This conclusion was justified on the ground that the 
Criminal Code did not retain the express exclusion of peaceful picketing from the 
definition of watching and besetting that had been in the earlier legislation (and 
which remained in the English statutes). For example, in 1902 striking machinists 
in Kingston were convicted of watching and besetting and fined $50 each simply 
legal action dragged on until September 1905 when the union gave consent for the 
action to be discontinued on condition that Canada Foundry pay the legal costs of the union. 
IB, October 1905,2, col.4. 
Magistrate Denison adopted this approach shortly after the Criminal Code came into force. 
See Tucker, "Between Two Worlds." In the Canada Foundry strike, he refused to allow the 
union secretary charged with intimidation a jury trial, although the case was subsequently 
withdrawn by the prosecution. See LG, August 1903,115,152. 
76S.C. 1905. c.9. When the amendment was introduced by Mr. Guthrie, he cited the fact that 
the ponce magistrate in Toronto had, on two occasions, held that the accused did not have 
an unrestricted right to elect trial by jury. The ensuing debate in the House of Commons 
produced the following exchange: 
Mr. Fitzpatrick. I think that amendment is already covered by the section, but if there 
is any doubt about it, as I understand there is, we should make it plain... 
Mr. Bergeron. That magistrate ought to be dismissed. 
Mr. Fitzpatrick. You cannot do that; he is too good a man. 
See Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 13 July 1905,9436-7. 
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for urging a strikebreaker to quit and lending him $5 to assist him to leave town. 
Although few watching and besetting cases reached the higher courts before the 
1920s, trade unionists became aware of, and concerned about, the emergence of 
this restrictive trend. In 1900, 1901, and 1902 the TLC passed resolutions at its 
conventions calling for action to be taken to reverse the stricter application of the 
criminal law to picketing.78 
The law of injunctions and the interpretation of the Criminal Code developed 
in tandem. After all, they regulated the same conduct and many injunctions were 
granted on the basis mat the picketers were engaged in criminal conduct Not 
surprisingly, therefore, judges disagreed as much about the scope of the criminal 
law prohibition as they did about the civil. Thus, for example, when metal polishers 
in Hamilton were charged with watching and besetting in 1900, they were acquitted 
based on the comments of Meredith CJ. in the Brantford contempt motion earlier 
that year.79 In some subsequent cases, J.G. O'Donoghue, a lawyer retained by the 
TLC and who represented unions in many of the important cases of the period,*0 
successfully argued that the omission of the peaceful picketing exemption made 
no legal difference because initially it had been inserted simply as a matter of 
precaution, not because it was necessary.81 
Perhaps the most dramatic test of the extent of the criminal law prohibition 
occurred in the context of the strike of the Brantford iron moulders against the 
William Buck Stove Works Co. in April 1908. In the early weeks of the strike there 
^Ontario, Bureau of Labour, Annual Report (1902), 151. Also see Rex v. Metcatf, a York 
County General Sessions case in which a picket was convicted of persistent following. 
Ontario, Bureau of Labour, Annual Report ( 1907), 221. For some magistrates, simply calling 
a strikebreaker "scab'' constituted criminal intimidation. For example, see Ontario, Bureau 
of Labour, Awtwa; ««port (1903), 178; (1906), 150 and (1907), 215. 
78TLC, Proceedings, 1900-3. On developments in England and Canada focusing on the later 
reported cases, see Jacob Finkelman, The Law of Picketing in Canada: I & II," University 
of Toronto Law Journal, 2 (1937-8), 67-101,344-60. 
^Hamilton Spectator (HS), 12 September 1900,5. col.4. 
^J.G. O'Donoghue was the oldest son of DJ. O'Donoghue, a prominent labour activist 
during the late-19th century. He graduated from law school in 1900 at the age of 29 and so 
was a rather inexperienced lawyer at the time he assumed the role of labour* s chief litigator 
and legal counsel. Morgan, Canadian Men and Women and Doris French, Faith, Sweat, and 
Politics (Toronto 1962), passim. 
81/texv. Bums (1903), 2 O.W.R. 1115 (County Ct). For similar result see Rex v. Fraser et 
al., a county court judgement, noted in Ontario, Bureau of Labour, Annual Report (1906), 
211 and Rex v. Goldberg, tried at the County of York Sessions, 14 December 1906. In that 
case. Judge Winchester in charging the jury said, "Pickets have a right to ask men to abstain 
from working and to find out what is going on or to give information. There is nothing in 
the law to prevent that" This case and the comment were referred to in a memorandum 
prepared by O'Donoghue for the Executive Committee of the TLC, dated 11 September 
1917. The memorandum was published in TLC, Proceedings, (1917), 193. Judge Winchester 
expressed a similar view in Rex v. Medcalf, LG, November 1907,618. 
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were a number of arrests arising out of violent incidents. Early in May, however, 
13 striking workers who were peacefully picketing were charged with watching 
and besetting and police magistrate Livingston committed them to trial despite the 
argument presented by O'Donoghue that the strikers broke no law. Moreover, the 
local crown attorney, Mr. Wilkes, advised the police to read the Riot Act if the 
picketing persisted. Apparently, the warning was not heeded and, although the 
Riot Act was not read, later that month some 60 striking workers who were 
peacefully picketing were issued summonses and ordered to appear before Magis-
trate Livingston on charges of watching and besetting. All were committed to trial 
at die June sessions, having elected to be tried by jury. Livingstone released the 
men on bail with a warning that if the picketing continued the men would be 
arrested, not summoned, and would be refused bail. Acting on the advice of J.G. 
O'Donoghue, the picketing continued the next day and nine strikers were arrested. 
Initially, they were denied bail, but the police magistrate subsequently backed 
down and the strikers were released to the cheers of a couple of hundred men 
84 
assembled outside die court 
By the time of the June sessions, nearly 100 moulders were facing charges. 
The grand jury returned a true bill in every case based on Judge Hardy's instructions 
that the law in Canada was different than in England and that even peaceful 
picketing to induce workers to leave their employment was contrary to the Criminal 
Code.95 Two test cases were then brought forward to trial. The evidence established 
that die men had been engaged in peaceful picketing and that there was no force 
or compulsion used. O'Donoghue argued for die defence mat mere was no case to 
go to die jury because Canadian law, like die English, did not prohibit this conduct. 
In light of his earlier comments, it was surprising mat Judge Hardy granted die 
motion. He indicated that compulsion was an element of die offence and in die 
absence of evidence diat die picketing was being conducted with a view to restrain 
men from working mere was no case to go to die jury. Accordingly, die two cases 
were dismissed and die remainder of die charges were dropped. 
On balance, die effort to have peaceful picketing treated as a criminal offence 
had only limited success. The Canadian Manufacturers' Association, which may 
have had a hand in bringing die charges, was disappointed, but put a brave face on 
die outcome. It suggested diat die prosecution had failed to bring forward evidence 
of die effect of, or motive for, die picketing and diat, on a proper view, "under die 
^See Brantford Courier, 21-24 April; 28-30 April; 1 & 4 May, 1908 and LG, June 1908, 
1480. 
"Brantford Courier, 1 & 4 May 1908. 
"Brantford Courier, 21 & 22 May 1908; Globe, 22 & 23 May, 1908. 
83 Brantford Courier, 10 June 1908; Globe, 10 June 1908. 
^Brantford Courier, 11 June 1908; Globe, 11 June 1908; LG, July 1908,94-5. 
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most peaceful circumstances the work of the picketers partakes of intimidation. 
This did not change the fact, however, that most judges were simply unwilling to 
limit the freedom of strikers to communicate to the extent that employers' were 
demanding. 
Despite their defensive victory, skilled workers were still finding that their 
traditional supply-side strategies — withdrawing labour and picketing to discour-
age replacements — were becoming less effective in disrupting their employers' 
production. Better organized strike-breaking and the availability of injunctions and 
criminal prosecutions to stop any activity mat hinted at compulsion or force did 
have an impact Other tactics were needed and demand-side strategies, most 
notably boycotts, began to be pursued more vigorously titan in the past These took 
two forms: consumer boycotts and trades boycotts. The first consisted of an 
organized campaign to con vince consumers not to purchase products inanufactured 
or supplied by employers who were "unfair" to labour, while die second involved 
a refusal by other trades to handle goods produced by non-union or scab labour. 
These strategies had been tried sporadically in Canada in the late 19th century with 
limited success. Employers had denounced this practice, but had not felt suffi-
ciently threatened by it to develop or pursue a legal counter-attack.** At the turn of 
the century, however, under the influence of the international unions, boycotting 
became more widespread in Canada and Canadian employers, following the 
example of their American and English counterparts, began to turn to die courts to 
prevent it89 
Here again, the legal path was paved by the English courts. Although there 
was initially a good bit of toing and froing by the courts, in the 1901 case of Quinn 
v. Leatham, die House of Lords unanimously held that, where such actions were 
motivated by an intent to injure or lacked justification, the tort of civil conspiracy 
was committed.90 In effect, this ruling allowed the court to scrutinize bom die goals 
pursued and means used by trade unions. If found to be "illegitimate," die 
perpetrators could be held liable. 
Employers and die courts were particularly hostile to actions that expanded 
die dispute beyond die immediate parties. Not only did dus cause more economic 
87/C, July 1908, 1107. The decision of Judge Mather in the Winnipeg plumbers' case is 
promoted as the better one. The Industrial Banner (IB), August 1908,4, col.2, in commenting 
on the decision, suggested that the CMA was behind the failed effort to make picketing illegal. 
''Tucker, "The Faces of Coercion." 
On US developments, see Haggai Hurvitz, "American Labor Law and the Doctrine of 
Entrepreneurial Property Rights: Boycotts, Courts, and the Judicial Reorientation of 1886-
1895," Industrial Relations Law Journal, 8 (1986), 307,328-44 and Daniel R. Ernst, "Free 
Labor, the Consumer Interest, and die Law of Industrial Disputes, 1885-1900," American 
Journal of Legal History, 36 (1992), 19-37; on England, see Klarman, "Judges Versus die 
Unions," 1501-13. 
90[1901]A.C.495. 
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damage, but the trade union was, in their eyes, inserting itself into trade relations 
to which it was, or should be, an outsider. This interference was unacceptable. For 
example, in Quinn die union was pursuing a closed shop through secondary action, 
and neither the goal nor the means were acceptable to the court. Closed shops 
interfered with die employer's right to manage and the rights of "free" labour to 
contract, while secondary action interfered with contractual relations between the 
target employer and its customers and between its customers and their employees.91 
Canadian employers were quick to take advantage of English legal develop-
ments. The first employer challenge was aimed against a consumer boycott 
launched against the Krug Furniture Manufacturing Co. Their counsel, E.A.A. 
DuVernet, sought not only to stop interference with employees, but also with the 
sale of Krug's products. An interlocutory injunction was obtained and, at trial, 
Judge R.M. Meredith held, "'Boycotting' is, in some of its forms, very obnoxious 
to the law." Although he did not elaborate, in the case before him he found there 
was some evidence of intimidation (not defined) which clearly made this boycott-
ing tortious. A perpetual injunction was granted. 
Further challenges to the legality of consumer boycotts were raised in the 
litigation arising out of a dispute between the Gurney Foundry Co. and its unionized 
employees over alleged discrimination against union members. Gurney had a long 
history of conflict with unions and had broken their power in his shops in the early 
1890s. Clearly, Gurney was not about to let them back in without a fight. Problems 
arose in January 1902 when Gurney dismissed two members of die Stovemounters 
International Union and twenty stovemounters struck in solidarity. Some members 
of die Metal Polishers' Union were subsequently let go and die other polishers also 
struck. By that summer, die Iron Moulders Union joined die fray. Although die 
strike and picketing by die unions caused some problems, Gurney was able to 
continue production of its stoves with non-union labour. To increase pressure on 
Gurney, die striking locals called for a national boycott of Gurney stoves. Locals 
affiliated with die striking unions brought die matter to local trades and labour 
councils and ultimately die boycott was endorsed by die TLC at its convention diat 
91 
On the theme of "outside" intrusion and its importance in labour law, see Karen Orrcn, 
Belated Feudalism (Cambridge 1991), 122-39. 
DuVernet's role as a labour lawyer is an interesting one. In the 1890s he defended striking 
employees of die J.D. King Company charged with criminal offences. In die period under 
discussion, his firm defended leaders of the Cobalt Miners' strike of 1907 charged with 
breaching the IDIA. See Tucker, "Between Two Worlds"; O.A. RG4-32, file 1907/1393; and 
John D. Honsberger, "E.E.A. DuVernet, KC; Lawyer, Capitalist, 1866 to 1915," in Carol 
Wilton, éd.. Beyond the Law: Lawyers and Business in Canada, 1830-1930 (Toronto 1990), 
167-200. 
93 
Krug Furniture Co. v. Berlin Union No. 112 Amalgamated Woodworkers International 
Union of America (1903), 2 O.W.R. 282. For a somewhat different report of the judgement 
see 5 O.L.R. 463. Quinn was cited with approval by Meredith J. in his judgement 
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September.94 Protests from Prince Edward Island to British Columbia were re-
ceived by Gumey. In Toronto, The Toiler, a labour paper associated with die district 
labour council, regularly published announcements on its front page reminding 
readers that Gumey Foundry, maker of Oxford stoves and ranges, are "STILL 
UNFAIR TO ORGANIZED LABOR" while in St Catharines sales of Oxford stoves 
were so poor that the local vendor gave up his agency. 
By August 1903, Gumey decided to begin a legal counter-offensive. Du-
Vemet, the lawyer who had represented Krug Furniture in its action, was retained 
and he launched three separate actions on behalf of Gurney. First, he commenced 
an action against die three striking locals, the Toronto and District Labour Council, 
and The Toiler. In addition to damages, Gumey sought — and readily obtained — 
an injunction to stop interference with employees and potential employees and the 
boycott.93 On die same day, he sued the Western Foundry Co. for hiring some 
apprentices under contract to Gurney.96 A little over two weeks later, DuVernet 
brought an action against various local trade union officials in St Cadiarines, 
including the officers of die St Catharines District Trades and Labour Council, for 
damages and an injunction which was granted ex parte.97 
The injunctions put an end to some boycott activities, like die published notices 
in The Toiler, but it is doubtful whether or not they had an impact on those members 
of die public sympathetic to the goals of labour. Moreover, The Toiler found ways 
to circumvent the injunction. For example, beginning in December, it ran a contest 
which it publicized in die same space formerly occupied by die Gurney boycott 
notice, inviting customers to write an essay on "WHY IS THE AD WHICH WAS IN 
THIS SPACE IN IT NO MORE."9* Then, from January to June 1904, it regularly 
published articles on die Gurney lawsuit thereby reminding its readers of Gurney's 
hostility to organized labour. 
The litigation against die union officials, now represented by J.G. 
O'Donoghue, die lawyer who handled most litigation for trade unions in Ontario, 
dragged on to no conclusive end. Aside from die fact that die injunctions were 
granted, no judgements were issued clarifying die boundaries of lawful behaviour. 
Nevertheless, die defendants in both cases agreed, as a condition of die final 
settlement of die actions, not to promote a boycott of Gurney's products. Thus, 
^ o r accounts of die origins of the dispute and boycott, see Gurney Foundry Co. v. Emmett, 
Action File 835/1903; Roberts. Toronto Metal Workers," 66 and TLC, Proceedings, ( 1902). 
^Gurney Foundry Co. v. Emmett, Action File 835/1903 and (1903), 2 O.W.R. 959. 
^Gurney Foundry Co. v. Western Foundry Co., Action File 834/1903. 
91 Gumey Foundry Co. v. McGlashan, Action File 905/1903. 
"The Toiler, 4 December 1903,1, cols. 3-4. 
"The Toronto injunction case ended with a consent judgement Tiled in September 1905. 
One of die terms of the judgement was that there would be no further attempts to convince 
die public not to purchase Gurney's products or to advertise that their goods were unfair. 
The St. Cadiarines case dragged on until February 1907 when Gumey agreed to accept $100 
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it would be fair to surmise that after this litigation union officials approached 
consumer boycotts more cautiously. 
The second solidarity tactic, the refusal by unionized workers to handle 
materials from non-union or "unfair" firms, was challenged in perhaps the most 
famous litigation of the era by the Metallic Roofing Company. The dispute arose 
when Metallic refused to sign a contract negotiated between the Amalgamated 
Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, Local Union 30 and a committee 
of employers in the trade during the summer of 1902. The members of the local 
voted overwhelmingly in favour of the contract and agreed to strike any employer 
nominal damages and $100 costs. As well, the defendants also agreed not to promote a 
boycott of Gurney products. 
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who would not sign it Metallic refused to sign, despite die fact that one of dwir 
managers had acted as secretary to die employer's negotiating committee, because 
die agreement provided for a closed shop and two of die ten men it employed in 
die affected department were non-union. Wim die approval of die International, 
Metallic was struck. Local and international union officials expected die fight to 
be "short, sharp, and decisive" both because "work is plentiful and men are scarce" 
and because die union anticipated diat it could count on other non-striking sheet-
metal workers to refuse to handle Metallic'* goods after tiiey were declared hot It 
quickly became apparent, however, diat diis was not going to be die case. By 18 
August J^. Chapman, recording secretary of die local advised international 
headquarters, "This has become die fight of all die trades in Toronto and else where 
[sic] in the Dominion of Canada."100 
Metallic Roofing commenced an action for damages and an injunction. It 
quickly obtained an interim injunction to prevent die union from pursuing die 
boycott and from watching and besetting. The injunction was continued by 
Meredith CJ. and an appeal from his decision was dismissed by die Divisional 
Court on die ground diat a prima facie case of conspiracy to injure had been 
made.101 Wim die injunction firmly in place, two important legal issues remained 
outstanding. First, there was die as yet unresolved question of trade union status. 
Metallic had named as defendants bom die local and international unions as well 
as various individuals. Second, was it tortious either for die union to call out its 
men or to notify odier employers diat its members would not handle Metallic's 
goods? 
The issue of trade union status had been looming on die horizon since Massey 
brought its actions in 1900, although preliminary skirmishes in tiiose cases pro-
duced no legal precedent The issue was crucial not in relation to injunctions, which 
could be framed to affect all members of a union regardless of whether or not tiiey 
were parties, but for die liability of die union in damages. If judgements could only 
be obtained against individuals in their personal capacity, then they hardly would 
be worth pursuing since monetary damages would be unrecoverable in most cases. 
If, however, trade union funds could be made exigible, then damages not only could 
be recovered, but employers could attack die institutional, organizational, and 
financial infrastructure of their opponents. They could exert pressure on unions to 
be "responsible."102 
Again, developments in England paved die way for Canadian employers. The 
decision of die House of Lords in Taff Vale established two ways of making trade 
See correspondence between Local 30 and the International contained in Metallic Roofing 
Co. v. Jose, Action Hie 639/1902. 
101Metallic Roofing Co. v. Local Union No. 30, Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers (1903), 
20.W.R.266. 
'^his was a major concern of employers. For example, see Adam Shorn, The Incorpo-
ration of Trade Unions'' IC, March 1903,368-9 and Bliss, Living Profit, 91-2. 
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unions liable. First, unions that registered under die Trade t/mon Act could be sued 
because, according to the court, this gave them legal status. Registered unions could 
be sued in their own name and be made liable for the authorized acts of their 
members. Second, individual union members could be sued in a representative 
capacity thereby making trade union funds liable to satisfy a judgement against 
them.*16 
From the beginning of the Metallic Roofing litigation, the question of trade 
union status was a crucial matter to both parties. Metallic, after all, had named the 
local and international unions as defendants. In February 1903 a motion was made 
to set aside service of a writ on an international union vice president as agent of 
and on behalf of die union. It was denied by die master and confirmed by Meredith 
J.. An appeal was subsequently allowed by Meredith C J. on die ground that there 
was no suggestion made mat trade unions in Canada had been given legal status 
by die legislature. He did, however, expressly leave open die possibility that a 
representative action might be brought. The plaintiffs quickly followed up dus 
suggestion and three days later they obtained an order from Chancellor Boyd that 
allowed named union officials to be sued both in their personal capacities and as 
representatives of all union members. Further appeals and motions followed and 
die matter finally came before die Court of Appeal in February 1904, although a 
judgement was not issued until January 1905. The court held that trade unions could 
not be sued in their own name, since they had no legal existence, but that die 
plaintiff could proceed in a representative action against both die local and 
international union.105 
With die issue of die form of die action settled (aldiough not its implications 
in respect of die attachability of trade union funds),106 die case could proceed to 
trial on the merits. A jury trial was held in Toronto at die end of October 1905, 
more dian diree years after die action was commenced. Metallic Roofing was 
successful. The jury found mat die plaintiffs' employees had been "wrongfully and 
maliciously coerced to leave its employment" by the defendants and diat die 
defendants conspired by threats or intimidation to induce the plaintiffs' customers 
to refrain from dealing widi diem. They assessed damages at $7,500. On die basis 
of diese findings of fact, die trial judge, applying Quinn, awarded damages to the 
plaintiffs for $7,500 and held mat trade union property was liable to satisfy die 
judgement As well, the injunction was made perpetual. 
mTaff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] A.C. 426. 
Also see Klarman, "British Labor Law," 1521-33. 
l0*MetaUic Roofing Co. v. Local Union No. 30 (1903), 5 O.L.R. 424. 
^Metallic Roofing Co. v. Local Union No. 30 (1905), 9 O.L.R. 171. For favourable 
employer comment, see IC, April 1905,556. 
Problems in this regard arose subsequently when the plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to 
garnishee a bank account held to the credit of the union and three of its officers in respect 
of costs which had been awarded by the court of appeal. Metallic Roofing Co. v. Local Union 
No. 30 (1905), 10O.L.R. 108. 
FORGING RESPONSIBLE UNIONS 113 
This verdict, including the surprising finding mat the trade union was an 
interloper even in relations between some of its members and their employer, set 
off afresh round of appeals mat ultimately led to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council. The Ontario judges were unanimously in favour of die result and 
could scarcely conceal dieir hostility toward die goals and means of the union in 
this case. Chancellor Boyd, speaking for die Divisional Court, saw dûs as an 
instance in which die union was intentionally inflicting harm by combined action 
without justification, while in die Court of Appeal Meredith J A. (formerly C J.) 
continuously referred to die union as "die foreign association" and found tiiere was 
ample evidence upon which die jury could have found tiiat die union was die 
controlling power. 
The Judicial Committee, however, allowed the appeal and sent die case back 
for a new trial In doing so, however, it avoided die substance of die legal dispute. 
Instead of ruling on die legality of die means used, it found diere bad been a 
mis-direction by die trial judge which may have left die jury under die impression 
dial calling die men out on strike by resolution was an actionable wrong in itself.107 
By this time, however, die parties had had enough and dwy eventually agreed to 
dismiss the action widiout costs.108 
What can we conclude from dus episode? The Canadian Manufacturers' 
Association tried to put die Judicial Committee's holding in a positive light, 
claiming dut it in no way affected die substance of die rulings on die illegality of 
boycotts, but tiiey hardly could have been pleased by die result, having contributed 
$9,000 towards die costs of die litigation. Trade unions, for their part, also could 
not have taken much comfort from die result, afthough diey too proclaimed victory. 
The legality of secondary trade boycotts was dubious, injunctions were just as easy 
to obtain as before, and die labour movement too had incurred significant legal bills 
in fighting die case.110 
Conclusion 
IN THE COURSE of die first strike wave of die second industrial revolution, large 
employers of skilled metal workers sought to change die terrain on which labour 
relations would be conducted. Their objective was, if not to rid themselves of 
unions entirely, then, to make diem behave responsibly. Responsible unions, as 
defined by employers, were to accept open shops and die use of strikebreakers and 
refrain from interfering with third-party economic relations by promoting boycotts 
™Metallic Roofing Co. v. Jose (1906), 12 O.L.R. 200 (Div. Ct); (1907), 14 O.L.R. 156 
(C.A.); [1908] A.C. 514. The appellants were also awarded costs in respect of the appeals 
from the trial judgement 
'"Action Hie, 639/1902; LG, March 1909,1018. 
109/C, August 1908,35 and Bliss, Living Profit, 92. 
a discussion of TLC reaction to this and other cases, see Craven, Impartial Umpire, 
196-207. 
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or engaging in sympathy strikes. Not coincidentally, responsible unions would 
be weak unions, unable to draw on communal or even strong craft solidarity. The 
law was an important resource for employers seeking to ensure responsible trade 
union behaviour. These employers not only insisted on exercising their legal 
privilege to maintain an open shop and to continue operating with replacement 
workers during strikes, but they also claimed a legally protected right to do so 
without interference from unionized workers. This right was asserted in the courts 
through civil actions for injunctions and damages and prosecutions under the 
criminal law. 
Legal strategies were attractive for two interrelated reasons. First, legal victo-
ries were enforceable through direct state coercion. Workers who violated court-
approved rights' claims were liable in damages to "injured" employers or, in the 
case of criminal transgressions, could be arrested and imprisoned. Police officers 
or other law enforcement personnel could be deployed to protect the property of 
employers and to enable the employer to operate with replacement workers. 
Second, the production of legal discourse that embraced employers' ideals of free 
labour and freedom of contract could have ideological effects. The judicial eleva-
tion of what were previously privileges to rights could enhance the legitimacy of 
the more restrictive institutional arrangements employers hoped to establish. 
How successful were employers in achieving their institutional and ideologi-
cal objectives? Measured in strictly legal terms, employers achieved substantial 
institutional victories. Many of their rights' claims were accepted by the judges. 
Consumer boycotts and refusals by workers in other locations to handle struck or 
non-union work were characterized as tortious interference. Inducing replacement 
workers to breach their contracts of employment by, for example, offering to find 
them alternative work, was also wrongful. Furthermore, it was beyond doubt that 
workers could not trespass on the employers' property or create a nuisance. m Once 
established as legal rights, injunctions could be issued and damages claimed against 
individual workers and trade union officials personally,113 and unions through 
representative actions. On the criminal side, physical coercion, threats, and intimi-
dation were clearly prohibited; so too was picketing if there was evidence that 
striking workers intended to prevent other workers from taking their places. 
Although the number of civil actions and criminal prosecutions was not large 
in proportion to the number of strikes during this period, the TLC took these 
1 ' 'For a useful expression of this agenda, see /C, September 1907,97-9. 
112For example, a representative of striking plumbers in Toronto who went on to an 
employer's premises to convince the plumbers employed there to join the strike was 
convicted of trespass and fined thirty dollars by the magistrate who, in sentencing the 
defendant, said: "I am going to stop this sort of thing." LG, November 1907,617-8. 
113For example, in Brauch v. Roth (1904), 10 O.L.R. 284, an official of the bricklayers and 
masons' union was sued for inducing breach of contract by calling members of the union 
off a job because the foundation had been laid by non-union labour. Damages of $50 were 
awarded. 
FORGING RESPONSIBLE UNIONS 115 
developments seriously. They, too, recogniird the strategic importance of the 
restrictions the law was placing on their freedom of action. Not only were numerous 
resolutions passed condemning the hostile attitude of the judiciary toward trade 
unions, but the TLC lobbied for anti-injunction legislation and for changes to the 
criminal law. It also retained J.G. O'Donoghue as its lawyer to fight important 
cases.119 On the political front, only in British Columbia did the campaign for 
anti-injunction legislation succeed, and the Criminal Code was amended only to 
clarify mat workers accused of watching and besetting had the right to elect trial 
by jury.116 
In the courts, workers contested die employers' legal offensive and partially 
blunted its effectiveness. Their lawyers were able to convince most judges that the 
employers' right to freedom of contract should not be extended to override the 
privilege of striking workers to communicate with non-striking workers. In most 
instances, judges refused to enjoin, or convict workers for, peaceful picketing. On 
the question of trade union status, most judges would not recognize the union as a 
separate legal entity, although representative actions could achieve a similar result 
Union lawyers were less successful in convincing judges that the closed shop was 
a lawful objective or that boycotts and sympathy strikes were lawful means. Even 
relatively sympathetic judges like William Meredith rejected these claims. Yet, 
when union members and officials committed unlawful acts, their lawyers learned 
to take advantage of procedural and technical niceties to avoid liability. Most civil 
actions ended in a stalemate, though employers won some important legal points. 
Damages were rarely awarded and there were formidable obstacles to collecting 
on judgements. These were important defensive victories. Reflecting back on this 
period in 1917, when faced with a new rash of injunctions in Manitoba, J.G. 
O'Donoghue wrote: "Some years ago in Ontario injunctions were largely resorted 
to in Labor [sic] disputes, but by constant hard fighting in the Courts (a very 
expensive process) the Judges eventually hesitated somewhat about granting 
injunctions in such extensive terms as appear in the recent Winnipeg injunc-
^ _ _ . wll7 
bons. 
Lawyers met with less success defending workers charged with criminal 
offenses. Charges were frequently tried by magistrates and lower court judges who, 
aside from their personal sympathies, were concerned to put an immediate end to 
ongoing disorder and violence, which was almost always occasioned by the use of 
114To date, we hive discovered only 19 Canadian strikes between 1900 and 1914 in which 
injunctions were issued (see Appendix 1). There were over 2400 strikes in this period. See 
Douglas Cruikshank and Gregory S. Kealey, "Strikes in Canada, 1891-1950," Labour/Le 
Travail, 20 (1987), 85-145. The number of strikes with criminal charges against workers is 
less certain, but our data suggests that criminal charges were at least twice as frequent 
llsCraven, Impartial Umpire, 200-7. 
1 Carrothers, "A Legislative History," 341-4 and references in supra, note 45. 
I,7See TLC, Proceedings, (1917). 193. 
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strikebreakers. This resulted in convictions, often with little concern for legal 
niceties. J.G. O'Donoghue, for example, while defending striking garment workers 
in Toronto, complained to a County Court Judge about the Toronto Police Court 
"I would not let a man take a charge over there at all. The strikers get the short end 
of it all the time."119 
Trade union lawyers also endeavoured to use the legal process offensively. In 
me Gurney litigation, O'Donoghue cross-examined W.C. Gurney on his affidavit 
at great length and, when Gurney refused to produce some documents and answer 
some questions, he brought a motion to have Gurney committed to jail for 
contempt In the Canada Foundry dispute, the union obtained information about 
the employer's strikebreaking activities and challenged the legality of their in-
trigues. As well, a picket who was arrested and subsequently acquitted brought an 
action for false arrest and imprisonment, while a strikebreaker who quit his 
employment brought a charge in police court against the company when it withheld 
his tools.120 In at least two instances, trade unions challenged the legality of an 
employer blacklist on the grounds that it constituted a civil or criminal conspiracy 
to injure.121 The Vancouver Trades and Labor Council successfully obtained an 
injunction to prevent a construction company from breaching its contract with them 
by using non-union labour in the construction of the new Labour Temple.122 
Strikebreakers and detectives were occasionally charged for their violent actions, 
but there were numerous complaints about the failure of the police and the courts 
123 
to protect striking workers from their provocations. 
1 ' Deputy Magistrate Kingsford, in defending himself against a Toronto Trades and Labor 
Council complaint of bias for convicting a worker and fining him $20, stated: "The friends 
of the strikers were giving a great deal of trouble and unless checked would have gone on 
and the peace of the city would have been endangered. A heavy fine was necessary and I 
imposed it without hesitation." Letter from R.E. Kingsford to J.R. Cartwright, Deputy A.G., 
16 July 1900, in AO, RG4-32, File 1900/1034. 
U9Toronto Telegram, 22 September 1913, clipping in National Archives of Canada (NAC), 
R027, Vol. 301, Strike 48. The protest of the Toronto TLC to the Premier about Deputy 
Magistrate Kingsford, ibid., is one of many such complaints. 
l20Gumey Foundry Co. v. Emmett (1903), 2 O.W.R. 1038; LG, September 1903, 267; 
February 1905,917. Another unsuccessful action for false iraprisonment was later brought 
by a machinist See Plant v, Jones & Moore Electric Co., LG, March 1908.1159-60 (Ont S.C.). 
™Mitchell v. Woods (1906), 4 W.L.R. 371 (B.C.S.C.) (civU conspiracy); R. v. Employers' 
Association, LG, February 1907,927 (criminal, police court Toronto). 
122James Conley, '"Open Shop' Means Closed to Union Men": Carpenters and the 1911 
Vancouver Trades General Strike," BC Studies, 91-2 (1991-92), 127-51 at 143. 
123For example, a private prosecution was launched against a detective who shot and 
wounded a person who claimed to be a by-stander during a strike-related riot in Owen Sound, 
Ont in May 1908. See AO, RG4-32, Hie 1908/653. Thiel Agency detectives who snot into 
a crowd wounding three strikers during a strike of gold miners in South Porcupine, Ont 
were convicted of unlawfully shooting with intent to cause bodily harm and fined $ 100. See 
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Hie use of injunctions against skilled workers declined after the 1900-1903 
strike wave.124 It is more difficult to assess changes in the incidence of the use of 
criminal sanctions,123 but any decline in the use of direct state coercion by 
employers should not be attributed exclusively to workers' successful resistance 
in the courts. Skilled workers also altered their tactics to reduce their exposure to 
civil actions and criminal prosecution. For example, consumer boycotts and other 
forms of secondary action were used less frequently in the strike waves of 1907-8 
and 1912-13. 
Observance of legal rules, however, does not necessarily signify acceptance 
of their normativity. The fear of incurring sanctions may be sufficient to induce 
strategic compliance. How successful, men, was the employers' legal strategy in 
achieving their ideological objectives? Of course, the employing class did not need 
to be convinced of the legitimacy of their claims, so their legal institutionalization, 
at best, may have helped confirm them in their beliefs and made h easier for mem 
to justify to themselves the application of coercion. However, the more significant 
question is the ideological impact of legal discourse on those less predisposed to 
accept the law's word. 
The absence of direct evidence of what most people believed (or how those 
beliefs were shaped) dictates caution in addressing mis question. Skilled unionized 
metal workers, the immediate targets of this form of legal coercion, probably did 
not feel they were wrongdoers, but rather the victims of a system that systematically 
favoured their employers. Moreover, unionized workers never accepted the legiti-
macy of "scab*' labour, despite judicial rhetoric defending its use on the grounds 
of individual freedom. Not only were striking workers prepared verbally to intimi-
date, but picket-line violence against replacement workers leading to criminal 
charges was not uncommon. Illegal boycotts and sympathy strikes became less 
frequent, but such actions generally required a higher degree of organization than 
spontaneous acts of defiance. Craft-union officials, concerned about the institu-
tional consequences of lawbreaking and their personal liability, were loath to 
NAC. R027, Vol. 300, Strike 3618. In Smith Falls, Ont., a strikebreaker was convicted on a 
firearms offence during a strike in 1914 by die Iron Moulders' Union against die Malleable 
Castings Co. His fine of $1 drew protests. See AO, RG4-32, File 1914/1914. In the 1914 
ILGWU strike against Dominion Cloak, fifteen strikers faced charges, but so too did two 
strikebreakers and two private detectives. J.G. O'Donoghue complained that the charge of 
disorderly conduct and the fine of $5 did not reflect the seriousness of the strikebreakers' 
misconduct He was also refused warrants when he complained about other assaults by 
strikebreakers, while strikers were arrested in the same incident See NAC, RG27, Vol. 303, 
Strike 9. 
,24Ten of the nineteen injunctions were obtained between 1900 and 1903. Nine of these 
were against skilled workers in southern Ontario. See Appendix 1. 
Our incomplete data suggests criminal charges were as likely to be brought against 
unskilled as skilled workers and that there was greater use of criminal law in the period from 
1906-08 than during the strike waves of 1899-1903 and 1912-13. 
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provide the necessary leadership, but that should not be mistaken for acceptance 
in principle of the right to trade by union leaders or the membership. 
The impact of this legal discourse on other segments of the public is even 
harder to gauge. There is no evidence of popular expression of opinion on the 
courts' decisions in the metal workers' strikes. The campaign to boycott Gurney 
stoves seems to have been successful enough to cause Gurney to take legal action, 
but consumer response to the judicial declaration that the boycott was illegal is 
unknown. Some evidence from other contexts suggests widespread hostility to the 
use of scab labour in many communities. For example, attempts by street railways 
to operate with scab labour frequently provoked a violent response from people in 
the affected community.126 In Buckingham, Québec, a coroners' jury examining 
deaths that occurred during a riot triggered by an attempt to run lumber mills with 
strikebreakers recommended that the men responsible for bringing them in should 
face criminal prosecution in addition to those who directly caused the deaths.1 7 
Perhaps the most that can be said is that the imprimatur of law was sufficient to 
produce the passive assent by significant numbers of people to the imposition of 
restrictions on trade union activity, but that workers and their immediate commu-
nities were less impressed. Overall, we suggest the industrial relations regime was 
weakly hegemonic. 
All of these conclusions, however, must be qualified by a reminder that we 
have only considered one component of a broader transformation of labour rela-
tions, their institutionalization and public representation. Skilled male craft work-
ers constituted a minority of the workforce and employers were increasingly able 
to expose their organizational weaknesses and take advantage of them. Industrial 
workers employed in sectors deemed to be central to the national economy were 
becoming a greater concern to state and business elites. Although their goals were 
often similar (for example, strike prevention, and responsible unionism), different 
institutional responses, including compulsory conciliation and massive use of state 
coercion, became a prominent feature of industrial conflict in those sectors. Any 
overall assessment of the institutionalization of labour relations, including both its 
coercive and ideological effectiveness, must take into account this broader picture. 
The legal changes examined here, however, are of abiding significance, even 
in regimes of statutory collective bargaining. Although the law now allows unions 
to demand a closed shop, boycotts and sympathy strikes are forbidden, and even 
more effective sanctions have been developed to punish workers and their unions 
for engaging in such conduct128 As well, picket-line conduct is carefully moni-
126Therc was rioting and other forms of violence during street railway strikes in Toronto 
(1902), Montreal (1903), Winnipeg (1906), Hamilton (1906), Halifax (1913), Port Arthur 
and Fort William (1913), and St John, N.B. (1914). (Source: LG). 
mLG, November 1906,556-8. 
,28See, for example, A.W.R. Carrothers, et al.. Collective Bargaining Law in Canada, 2d 
éd., (Toronto 1986). 
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tored, injunctions are still readily available and criminal charges are still common. 
In short, pragmatic acceptance of judicially anttructed and enforced labour laws, 
let alone normative acceptance, is as tenuous as ever. 
The authors would like to thank Chris Tomtins, GregKealey, Reuben Hasson, and 
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version of this article, originally presented at the North American Labor History 
Conference, Wayne State University, Detroit, October 27-29,1994. 
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Appendix l 
Labour Injunctions in Canada, 1900-1914 
(Preliminary List) 
No. Year, City, Province Employer Union 
1 1900, Toronto.ON Massey-Hairis bon Moulders Union 
2 1900, Brentford, ON Massey-Harris Iron Moulders Union 
3 1901, Rossland, BC LeRoi Mining Co. et iL Western Federation of Miners 
4 1902, Toronto, ON Gurney Foundry Iron Moulders Union et al. 
5 1902, Toronto, ON Metallic Roofing Amalgamated Sheet Metal 
Workers Union 
6 1902, Berlin, ON Krug Furniture Amalgamated Woodworkers' Int'l. 
Union 
7 1902, London, ON Grand Opera American Federation of Musicians 
8 1903, Toronto, ON Dixon Carriage Works Carriage Makers' Union 
9 1903, Toronto, ON Canada Foundry Iron Moulders Union 
10 1903, Berlin, ON Braucb (contractor) Bricklayers' and Masons' Union 
11 190S, Stratford, ON Grand Trunk Railway Int'l. Assoc, of Machinists et al. 
12 1905, Toronto, ON Hough Lithographing Lithographers' Union 
13 1906, Winnipeg, MB Vulcan Iron Works Int'l. Assoc, of Machinists et al. 
14 1906, Port Arthur, ON Canada Foundry Int'l. Iron Workers Union 
15 1906, Winnipeg, MB Master plumbers Journeymen Plumbers et al. Union 
16 1907, Cobalt, ON Silver Mines Western Federation of Mines 
17 1909, Spiinghill, NS Cumberland Railway United Mineworkers of America 
18 1909, Glace Bay, NS Dominion Coal United Mineworkers of America 
19 1913, Winnipeg, MB Morley & Sons et al. Painters and Decorators Union 
(Principal source: LG) 
